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and its Impact on the Reduction 
of Systemic Risk
A B S T RAC T
The main objective of this paper is a holistic representation of the idea 
of macro-supervision, pointing to the need for its implementation and 
demonstration based on research and historical data that macro-pru-
dential policy can significantly prevent the materialization of systemic 
risk in the banking business. This means that it will be able to coun-
teract this risk in both temporal and structural terms, translating into 
better functioning of the real economy, which the financial system pri-
marily serves. The article will present the history of the idea of macro-
supervision and its concept in the light of different economic schools. 
Next, the characteristics of the financial system, sources of systemic 
risk and macro-prudential policy objectives will be shown. Attention 
will also be given to the other objectives of this idea. In the next stage 
of work, a range of policy instruments will be presented. 
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supervision
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S T R E S Z C Z E N I E
Polityka makroostrożnościowa i jej wpływ na zmniejszanie ryzyka 
systemowego
Głównym celem artykułu jest holistyczne przedstawienie idei makro-
nadzoru, wskazanie na potrzeby jej implementacji oraz wykazanie na 
podstawie danych historycznych i  badań, że polityka makroostroż-
nościowa może istotnie przeciwdziałać materializacji ryzyka syste-
mowego w działalności bankowej. Oznacza to, że będzie ona w sta-
nie przeciwdziałać temu ryzyku w wymiarze zarówno czasowym, jak 
i strukturalnym, przekładając się na lepsze funkcjonowanie gospodar-
ki realnej, której system finansowy przede wszystkim służy. W pracy 
została przedstawiona historia idei makronadzoru oraz opisana cha-
rakterystyka systemu finansowego, źródła ryzyka systemowego, a tak-
że cele i instrumenty polityki makroostrożnościowej. 
S Ł O WA  K LU C Z E :  Unia Europejska, system finansowy, nadzór 
makroostożnościowy
Introduction
Macro-supervision is a  concept that assumes to become an important 
binder between micro-prudential and macroeconomic policies. As an idea, 
its main objective is to maintain the stability of the financial system, and as 
a policy it will use both its own instruments and the already existing ones. 
Together with existing prudential policies, macro-supervision has the op-
portunity to create a robust system to monitor the activities of economic 
system operators, with particular attention also being paid to the links be-
tween the relevant operators within this system. 
 This is an extremely important topic from the point of view of the finan-
cial system, which is nowadays highly correlated with the real  economy, 
and its instability can be a major threat to the development of economies 
in terms of individual countries, organizations of several countries with 
varying degrees of integration, or global development. Appropriate mea-
sures to preserve such macro-stability of the financial system may be ne-
cessary nowadays.
 The paper will verify the hypothesis that a properly introduced macro-
-prudential policy can effectively reduce the probability of materializ-
ing systemic risk, as historically introduced in individual countries, it has 
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already provided tangible benefits in terms of maintaining macro-stability 
of the financial system.
History and characteristics of macro-supervision
In general, the objective of a macro-prudential policy is to manage factors 
that may jeopardize the stability of the financial system as a whole, even 
if these factors do not appear to be dangerous when viewed from the per-
spective of individual activity. 
 In the financial system, the following risks can be distinguished: 1 li-
quidity risk; counterparty risk; market risk; credit risk; interest rate risk; 
currency risk; operational risk; strategic risk; and systemic risk. Natural-
ly, any sharing of risks is quite arbitrary and seems to escape the standard 
framework within which it could be exactly closed, so defining risk is quite 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, the above segmentation provides an opportuni-
ty to take a closer look at the risks in the financial system.
 The concept of macro-supervision, which refers to keeping structu-
ral (systemic) risks in check, is aimed at threats that are always present in 
the economy to some extent, while the concept of cyclical risk draws at-
tention to the catastrophic banking activity, which intensifies both a bull 
(overheating of the economy) and bear market (deepening of recession). 
Macro-prudential policy, in its applied nature, is a policy of relatively short 
duration, however, even as an idea it appeared much earlier than the date 
of the collapse of the US mortgage market would indicate.
 Currently, the main functions of the entire banking system are con-
sidered to be mainly:
• creating mechanisms for gathering funds and investing them in  various 
undertakings, 
• providing effective banking risk management solutions, 
• providing price information 
• creating conditions for transformation of investment means. 2
 These points are the core of the banking system. Generally speaking, 
the more effectively they are filled by the banking sector, the more stable 
the sector operates, and vice versa, the further away the system goes away 
from these guidelines for various reasons, the more fluctuations it is ex-
posed to. The main task of macro-prudential policy is therefore to influ-
ence the banking sector (or, more broadly, the financial sector) in such 
1 M. Iwonicz-Drozdowska, Bankowość zagadnienia podstawowe, Poltext, Warszawa 2010, p. 231.
2 W. Jaworski, Współczesny bank, 2nd ed., Poltext, Warszawa 2000.
Cross‑cultural Management / Zarządzanie międzykulturowe
86
perspektywy kultury (No. 25)
a way as to prevent significant deviations from this set of rules even in the 
preventive phase. 
 Interestingly, depending on the approach, the role of the financial sys-
tem in the transmission of crises has been differently emphasized.  British 
economist and representative of the post-Keynes school, Joan Robinson, 
said in one of her works 3 that the development of this sector follows more 
directly with the development of the whole country, rather than deve lop in-
dependently of it. In a similar vein also spoke Nobel Prize winner, Ameri-
can economist Robert Lucas. 4 He considered excessive concern about the 
role of the financial sector (in the transmission of crises) to be unnecessary. 
Today it is known that both Robinson and Lucas did not formulate their 
ideas entirely accurately.
 One of the first scientists to draw attention to the important role of feed-
back between the financial system and the real economy was an Ameri can 
economist, Irving Fisher. Just as the real beginning of the implementation 
of the macro-supervision policy was the outbreak of the crisis of 2007, so 
the beginning of the idea itself was the crisis of 1929. Four years after the 
beginning of the greatest downfall of the 20th century, Fisher presented 
his concept of debt deflation, 5 which can be presented as a cause and effect 
chain in 9 steps:
1. The necessity of debt liquidation leads to a sudden and frantic fire 
sell of assets. 6
2. Shrinkage of deposits with the repayment of bank loans and slow-
ing down the pace of money circulation
3. Decreasing aggregated deposits and reduced speed of money circu-
lation due to sudden asset sales
4. A fall in the general price level, which (if undisturbed by deflation) 
contributes to a further decline in the net worth of businesses and 
an increased number of bankruptcies
5. Decrease in corporate profits
6. Social anxiety about the future of companies whose profit dyna-
mics are significantly decreasing which results in a  reduction in 
overall production, a decrease in the value of trade and an increase 
in unemployment
7. Increased overall pessimism and decreased investor confidence
3 J. Robinson, The Rate of Interest and Other Essays, Macmillan, London 1952.
4 R. Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, “Journal of Monetary Economics,” 1998, 
No. 1.
5 I. Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, “Econometrica,” 1933, No. 4, p. 342.
6 Fisher here uses the term distress selling, currently used, however, the term fire sells, meaning 
a sudden sale of assets will be used herein.
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8. Hoarding money and slowing down its circulation
9. Nominal declines and increases in real interest rates, due to deflation.
 Although the 20th century economy was much more affected by infla-
tion than by deflation, this does not mean that Fisher’s pattern is not cor-
rect. In fact, less than 80 years later, the pattern repeated itself, and a fire 
sale which initiates the pattern, occurred again. In this sense, the banking 
sector, through its pro-cyclical activities, contributed to the exacerbation 
of the crisis, causing a significant drop in property prices through massive 
property sales. 
 One of the numerous effects of the financial crisis was the development 
of a set of recommended market practices for financial risk management 
in the financial sector. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was 
established at the end of 1974 at the Bank for International Settlements in 
Basel, created by central bank directors belonging to the G10. Its first meet-
ing was held in February 1975. 7 The Committee’s intention was to provide 
a platform for regular cooperation on the broader issue of supervision of the 
financial system, with the aim of highlighting the role of monitoring the 
acti vities of financial actors in maintaining the stability of the sector. 8 
 Members of the Committee are currently CEOs of monetary policy insti-
tutions, in 60 different countries, mainly from the EU, North America and 
Asia (but also from South America and Africa). The most important docu-
ments issued by the Basel Committee are the 1988 Capital Accord (UK) 
(colloquially called Basel I), the 2004 New Capital Accord (NUK) (collo-
quially called Basel II) and the latest agreement known as Basel III, of 2010. 
 The arrangements of the Basel Committee under the III Capital Agree-
ment are the crowning achievement of the development of the macro su-
pervision concept. In Poland, this concept is materialized under the “Act 
on macro-prudential supervision of the financial system and crisis man-
agement in the financial system” of 15 August 2015. It provides a frame-
work for the implementation of this policy in the Republic of Poland.
Systemic risk characteristics and place of macro 
supervision in the financial system 
Given the specific risks that may arise in the financial system, there is 
a need to manage these risks properly and to prevent them from escalating. 
7 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision chronology, http://www.bis.org/about/chronology.
htm?m=1%7C4%7C550 (access: 09.12.2018).
8 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (access: 09.12.2018).
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The set of rules and principles that relate to preventive actions before sys-
temic risk materializes is called macro-prudential policy. 
 Macro-supervision policy is explained comprehensively by Claudio 
Borio, 9 juxtaposing its direct and indirect targets with micro-prudential 
policy objectives. An additional comparison is made between the risks 
these policies manage and how their instruments are calibrated. The com-
parison is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of macro- and micro-prudential policies
Categories Macro-supervision Micro-supervision
Indirect objective
Limiting risk across the 
financial system
Limiting the risk of the 
individual units in the 
financial system
Direct objective Avoiding recession as 
measured by a fall in real 
GDP
Protection of the client/
bank’s depositary
Risk model Partly endogenous Exogenous




Calibration of instruments In the sense of influencing 
the system as an integral 
whole, “top down”
In the sense of individual 
entities in the system, 
“bottom up”
Source: C. Borio, Towards a macro-prudential framework for financial supervision and regu-
lation? BIS, Iss. 128, 2003, p. 2, http://www.bis.org/publ/work128.pdf (access: 09.12.2018).
 Borio points to three main elements in favor of the implementation of 
macro-prudential policy: 10 
1. high costs of materializing systemic risk for the whole economy,
2. the need to maintain a balance between state surveillance and mar-
ket self-regulation,
3. the nature of financial instability and its sources.
 In this dimension, macro-supervision also becomes responsible for the 
proper functioning of non-financial sectors, i.e. not allowing too much 
fluctuation of real GDP in relation to potential, both upward (overdraft) 
and downward (sub-optimal flow of credit to the economy). 
 A special type of risk, which is systemic risk, is worth our attention for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, it tends to accumulate in good times, when 
9 Claudio Borio is a doctor of economics at Oxford University; since November 2013 he is Presi-
dent of the financial and economic department at the Bank for International Settlements.
10 C. Borio, Towards a macro-prudential framework for financial supervision and regulation?, “BIS,” 
2003, Iss. 128, p. 2, http://www.bis.org/publ/work128.pdf (access: 09.12.2018).
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the tendency to estimate it is significantly lower, and secondly, it may lead 
to the collapse of the entire financial system, even if the particular actors 
of a  market act in accordance with a  policy of correct and fully logical 
risk management from a micro perspective. The systemic risk sharing pro-
posed by the International Monetary Fund is presented in Table 2.
Table 2. The dimensions of systemic risk, according to the IMF
Time dimension Cross-sectional dimension
The mechanism is based on the belief 
that in good and bad times, the risk 
estimated by financial market agents and 
other markets is underestimated and 
overestimated, respectively. What in the 
former case aggravates the process of risk 
accumulation, in the latter case makes it 
difficult to recover from recession caused 
by the materialization of that risk.
Pro-cyclicality in the financial system is 
most often an expression of the volatility 
in the size of banks’ aggregate lending 
and changes in their overall liquidity 
levels caused by their excessive leverage 
and maturity mismatches in their balance 
sheets. 
It refers to the risk already accumulated 
at the moment. If the mechanism of risk 
accumulation over time as a result of pro-
cyclical activity of the financial system 
is dynamic and is a process, then the 
occurring risk in the structural dimension 
may additionally drive the materialization 
of systemic risk, with its simultaneous 
occurrence of risk in the temporal 
dimension.
In certain situations, however, the 
structural dimension of risk may also 
exist in isolation from the temporal 
dimension. Such situations may certainly 
include exposures of financial sector 
entities to the same assets, or very close 
interconnectedness; if, in addition, there 
is a single parent entity in such a financial 
system that is systemically important for 
the sector as a whole, the so-called SIFI, 
its failure, or even liquidity problems, 
may affect other entities in the network. 
Otherwise, materializing risk in this very 
large entity may be risky not only for the 
entity itself, but also for other institutions 
in this sector, through transmissions of 
this materialized risk, through contagion 
effect channels.
Source: the author’s own development based on: Macroprudential Policy – An Organizing 
Framework, International Monetary Fund, 2011.
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Macro-prudential policy instruments 
Macro-prudential policy instruments may be adapted to the appropriate 
risks. The most important risks in the financial system are liquidity and 
credit risk. Liquidity risk is the likelihood of a change in the desired degree 
of liquidity held by a financial institution. The state in which liquidity is 
too low may occur in some cases. As a result of changes in interest rates or 
sudden withdrawals of deposits by customers during panic (so-called run 
on banks), the value of such deposits may decrease dramatically, causing 
short-term or long-term liquidity problems. Additional risk factors may 
also include an increase in the number of deposits withdrawn before ma-
turity, unforeseen costs of banking activities (e.g. related to the introduc-
tion of a banking tax) or, above all, a change in customers’ risk preferences. 
 The instruments that can limit the probability of materialization of li-
quidity risk include, first of all: 
• LCR (liquidity coverage ratio) indicators,
• NSFR (net stable funding ratio) indicators,
• liquidity buffers,
• mandatory reserve rate.
 LCR and the NSFR indicators provide a measure of operating liquid-
ity, recommended for implementing by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (Basel III). The main aim of the LCR 11 is to promote the 
materialization of banks’ resilience to short-term liquidity risk. The bank 
must therefore have an adequate stock of unencumbered, liquid, high-
quality assets (HQLAs) which can be instantly transformed into cash, and 
which should provide 30-day operations of the bank, as part of the fulfill-
ment of the liquidity shortage scenario. The greater the liquidity of the as-
sets, the greater weight suited to them.
 LCR is calculated as the quotient of high-quality assets (HQLA) by 




 If the liability item within the NCO is very stable, its weight is quite 
small (to a lesser extent the liability is to be covered by liquid funds from 
the HQLA inventory). 12 According to the Basel Committee, the proper 
11 “Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools,” Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, 2013, p. 7, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf (access: 21.03.2016).
12 P.  Niedziółka, Analiza potencjalnych korzyści oraz negatywnych konsekwencji wdrożenia norm 
LCR oraz NSRF w bankach europejskich, SGH, p. 2, http://kolegia.sgh.waw.pl/pl/KES/kwartal-
nik/Documents/PN231.pdf (access: 21.03.2016).
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functioning of the LCR measure aims to improve the banking sector’s abili-
ty to absorb economic and financial shocks, regardless of their source, as 
well as reduce the incidence of adverse spillover effects that could adverse-
ly affect the entire economy. The standard promoting financial stabili ty in 
the sense of liquidity has also been extended by the Committee to include 
longer-term liquidity requirements. 
 A complementary measure of the LCR is therefore the NSFR, which is 
to provide liquidity to banks for up to 1 year (365 days). Its main task for in-
stitutions is to go from unstable long-term projects financing (e.g. to grant 
mortgage loans) with short-term resources (e.g. short-term deposits). This 
phenomenon, commonly known as the maturity mismatch between assets 
and liabilities, can pose a serious risk of creating negative externalities for 
the system as a whole if financial institutions were suddenly forced to sell 
off assets as liquidity buffers. Financing banks from short-term roll-over de-
posits on the interbank market is to replace the acquisition of funds from 
medium and long-term deposits and/or long-term debt securities. 
 NSFR 13 is calculated by dividing the available amounts of AASF 
(Amount of Available Stable Funding) and the sum of RASF (Required 




 Similarly, to the LCR, the more stable the type of financing (AASF), 
the higher its weight. Since RASF is the sum of weighted assets that need 
to be covered by liabilities of an appropriate quality, the more liquid these 
assets are, the lower their weight. 14 
 The most characteristic type of risk to be managed by a bank is credit 
risk, understood as the possibility of deterioration of the situation of a fi-
nancial entity with which we have a contract. 
 Expansionary credit action can fuel the creation of a speculative bub-
ble and thus lead to an increase in the value of assets. If the revaluation of 
these assets is precisely due to the easy availability of credit, the use of the 
macro-prudential policy instrument known as the LTV (Loan -To-Value) 15 
indicator may be a good solution. 
13 “Basel III: the net stable funding ratio”, Bank for International Settlements, 2014, http://www.
bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf (access: 21.03.2016).
14 P.  Niedziółka, Analiza potencjalnych korzyści oraz negatywnych konsekwencji wdrożenia norm 
LCR oraz NSRF w bankach europejskich, SGH, p. 5, http://kolegia.sgh.waw.pl/pl/KES/kwartal-
nik/Documents/PN231.pdf (access: 01.02.2018).
15 If, for example, the value of a property is 1,000,000 PLN, and the mortgage granted for it is 
800,000 PLN, the LTV ratio = 800,000 PLN/1,000,000 PLN = 80%. The lower the LTV, the 
greater the down payment required from the borrower.
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 Research 16 shows that adequate regulation of LTV may have a signifi-
cant impact on changes in real estate prices. The correlation between this 
measure and real estate prices is positive (an increase in LTV by 10 per-
centage points is accompanied by an increase in nominal real estate prices 
by approx. 13%) this indicator should be variable over time, higher in the 
time of a downward trend and lower in the time of a boom. It is comple-
mentary to another indicator that could affect the size of aggregate lend-




 DTI is a  measure of how much the lending institution burdens the 
debtor with the loan and the need to service its interest. Most often, there-
fore, the meter is the sum of the installment and the interest on the loan in 
a given period, compared to the amount of the debtor’s income in the cor-
responding period. It is worth noting that we are talking about net income 
(after tax), however, the measure of such income may also be the amount 
of money that the borrower will have at his disposal after deducting not 
only tax but also some other fixed payments such as repayment of other 
loans, or the need to pay other than income taxes (e.g. on real estate). It is 
worth noting that the DTI that is constant in time can have a pro-cyclical 
effect, 17 just as the LTV should be variable in time, and just as it should be 
higher in time of downhill and lower in time of boom.
 It is estimated 18 that prudent lending practices in Hong Kong result-
ing, among other things, from the introduction of LTV and DTI limits 
as complementary macro-prudential policy instruments, stopped the 1994 
real estate boom, protecting Hong Kong from the 1997 crisis. For exam-
ple, the LTV index was also reduced in China after the 2008 crisis – in 
2010-2011 from 80% to 70% for the purchase of the first home and to 50% 
(in 2010) and then 40% (in 2011) for the purchase of the second home. 19 
16 C. Crowe, G. Dell’Ariccia, D. Igan, P. Rabanal, Policies for macrofinancial stability: options to 
deal with real estate booms, International Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note, SDN/11/02, 
2011, pp. 20-21.
17 Pro-cyclicality of constant DTI results, among others, from faster price growth than the income 
security. 
18 C. Crowe, G. Dell’Ariccia, D .Igan, P. Rabanal, Policies for macrofinancial stability, op. cit., p. 21.
19 F. Columba, A. Costa, P. Kongsamut, C. Lim, A. Otani, M. Saiyid, T. Wezel, X. Wu, Macropru-
dential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences, MFW 
2011, p. 74.
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The DTI 20 was implemented in a large number of countries around the 
world. 21 In South Korea it was introduced in 2005, and since then it has 
been counter-cyclically modified six times by October 2011 (reduced and 
doubled four times).
 Among the tools for credit risk management, particular attention 
should also be paid to the possibility of reducing the amount of credit not 
only for the economy as a whole, but also for certain sectors of the econo-
my that are suspected to have a speculative bubble. In this way, unlike in-
terest rate regulation, the inflow of low-interest money is limited not to the 
whole economic system, but only to its elements, on which local bubbles 
caused by cheap credit may appear.
Conclusions
Macro-prudential policy is a relatively new concept for building a stable 
global financial system. Although the importance of financial institutions 
and markets was already recognized at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry, it was only in recent years that the possible negative impact of a col-
lapse of the financial system on the whole economy was empirically con-
firmed. The idea that the stability of the system equals the stability of the 
indivi dual entities that make it up was denied by the outbreak of the cri-
sis. Macro-prudential policy can therefore be the answer to how to protect 
the financial system from its costly destabilization by becoming the link 
between micro-prudential policy and the economy of the whole country.
 With a set of appropriately calibrated instruments, it can ensure that 
the functions carried out by the financial sector are not subject to shocks in 
view of the overall health of the economy. In addition, addressing these in-
struments to the relevant risks faced by the economy, i.e. differentiating be-
tween liquidity, counterparty, credit, interest rate, currency volatility, mar-
ket fluctuations and ultimately general system risks, may allow the policy 
to operate more effectively and optimize its functions.
 Examples confirming that macro-prudential policy can significantly 
counteract the materialization of systemic risk in banking operations in-
clude stopping the growing housing loan bubble in the mid-1990s, but 
also the use of unremunerated reserve requirements (URR), the mecha-
nism of which acts as a tax without a fiscal function on capital inflows. An 
20 Ibidem, pp. 74-80.
21 Among others, Colombia, Croatia, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, South Korea, Norway, Po-
land, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Thailand. 
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URR of 20% was introduced, among others, in Chile 22 in June 1991. In 
August 1992, it was increased to 30%. In June 1998, the URR was lowe-
red to 10%, and in September of that year it was abolished. As a result of 
the application of the URR from 1990 to 1997, short-term revenues (up to 
1 year) as a percentage of total revenues decreased from 90.7% to 2.8%, and 
long-term revenues increased from 9.7% to as much as 97.2%.
 An appropriate justification of the need to implement macro-pruden-
tial policy, its precise objectives, the identification and allocation of risks 
and appropriate instruments, and the creation of an appropriate functio-
nal and legal environment in which the policy can operate, can contribute 
to more stable global economic growth, by maintaining a balanced finan-
cial environment.
 Despite the benefits that macro-prudential policy can bring when prop-
erly implemented, there is also a need to clearly identify the research gaps 
that would need to be filled by carrying out appropriate research, implic-
itly calibrated for the relevant economies which macro-prudential poli-
cy is to be applied to. The main question to be considered is whether one 
or more of these policy instruments should be introduced. The decision 
should in principle depend on what area of risk we address, but it should 
also be important in this case to examine whether the decision-making 
system should be automated or allow for more arbitrary decisions, and if 
so, to what extent? Furthermore, it would also be worth considering the 
stability of instruments over time, i.e. whether their range and calibration 
should change from period to period, and whether they should change in 
an anti- or pro-cyclical manner. Another important element is the impact 
of macro-prudential rules on fiscal, monetary and micro-prudential poli-
cies and on cross-border capital flows. It would be useful to examine which 
rules are complementary to each other and which are contradictory. 
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